What We've Been Signed Up To

A plain-English register of the defence and security agreements Australia's government has signed with other nations. What each one is, what it commits Australia to, and where to read the text. This is an information document — not an argument — so that Australians can see, in one place, the commitments made in their name.

The web at a glance

1. How to read this register

Not every “agreement” is the same kind of thing, and governments rarely spell out the difference. Three tiers do most of the work:

Treaties (binding). Concluded in writing, governed by international law, and — in Australia — tabled in Parliament and scrutinised by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) before entering into force. A treaty creates real legal obligations. Only a few of Australia's treaties contain a mutual-defence clause — a promise that an attack on one is treated as an attack on both.

Cooperation & access arrangements. Status-of-forces agreements, reciprocal-access agreements and defence-cooperation agreements set the legal terms for forces to train, visit, exercise and be based in each other's territory. They deepen integration and interoperability but do not, by themselves, commit Australia to go to war.

Dialogues & partnerships. Groupings like the Quad, and partnership programmes like Australia's with NATO, coordinate posture and messaging. They are politically significant and shape alignment, but bind no one to a defence obligation.

The entries below are grouped by tier, most-binding first. Where a “mutual defence” commitment exists, it is flagged plainly.

2. The alliances — mutual-defence commitments

These are the agreements that go furthest: a commitment, in some form, to treat an attack on the other as a shared danger.

ANZUS Treaty — United States (and New Zealand), 1951

The founding security treaty of the Australia–US alliance, signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. The parties undertake to consult when any of them is threatened in the Pacific and declare that an armed attack on one “would be dangerous” to the others, who would “act to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes.” Note the wording: it is a promise to act, not an automatic obligation to fight — softer than NATO's Article 5. New Zealand's leg was suspended by the United States in 1986 over its ban on nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ship visits; the Australia–US alliance remains in full force and is managed through the annual AUSMIN ministerial talks and joint facilities such as Pine Gap. Money: No direct payment — the alliance is resourced from Australia's own defence budget. Commits Australia to: consultation and a good-faith commitment to respond to an attack on the US in the Pacific; hosting joint intelligence facilities. Treaty record (AustLII / DFAT).

AUKUS — United States and United Kingdom, 2021

Announced 15 September 2021, AUKUS is a trilateral partnership with two “pillars.” Pillar 1 is the nuclear-powered submarine programme: under the March 2023 “Optimal Pathway,” Australia is to buy several second-hand US Virginia-class boats from the early 2030s, then build a new British-designed SSN-AUKUS class. Pillar 2 covers advanced capabilities — undersea drones, hypersonics, quantum, AI, electronic warfare. It rests on a stack of binding instruments: the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (signed November 2021, in force February 2022); the trilateral submarine treaty (2024); and the UK–Australia Geelong Treaty (26 July 2025), a 50-year agreement to co-build the submarines. Headline cost is around A$368 billion to the mid-2050s. AUKUS is not itself a mutual-defence treaty, but it locks Australia's most consequential military capability into US and UK supply chains, industrial timelines and — through statutory transfer conditions — US discretion. Money: ~A$368 billion to the mid-2050s — the largest defence commitment in Australia's history — including about A$4.6 billion (£2.4 billion) into the UK submarine industrial base and roughly US$3 billion into the US industrial base. Commits Australia to: a multi-decade, ~A$368B submarine build; deep integration with US/UK nuclear and defence-industrial systems; hosting expanded US and UK submarine activity. AUKUS (DFAT). See also MMA's AUKUS Cost Blowout and Building the Sub to Nowhere.

Pukpuk Treaty — Papua New Guinea, 2025  (mutual defence)

The PNG–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty, signed in Canberra on 6 October 2025 by Prime Ministers Albanese and Marape. This is the significant one: it is Australia's first new mutual-defence alliance since ANZUS in 1951 — 74 years — and PNG's first-ever defence treaty. It contains a genuine mutual-defence clause: an armed attack on one is to be treated as an attack on both. It also opens a recruitment pathway for Papua New Guineans to serve in the Australian Defence Force (eligible PNG citizens resident in Australia could apply from 1 January 2026), commits Australia to modernising the PNG Defence Force over decades, and preserves PNG's other defence relationships (a nod to its ties with China and others). The treaty was referred to JSCOT on 25 November 2025. Money: No headline figure published; Australia funds PNG Defence Force modernisation over 50 years, on top of being PNG's largest existing aid and defence-cooperation partner. Commits Australia to: a binding mutual-defence obligation toward PNG; long-term funding and build-up of the PNGDF; integration of PNG personnel into the ADF. Treaty text (DFAT, PDF) · Parliamentary record.

3. Pacific security treaties — money and services for a say

A distinct recent pattern: binding treaties with small Pacific nations in which Australia provides budget support, banking, policing and disaster help in exchange for an effective say — a veto in practice — over those nations' security, banking and infrastructure dealings with third countries. The unstated third country is China, following its 2022 security pact with Solomon Islands.

Tuvalu — Falepili Union, 2023

Signed 9 November 2023, in force 28 August 2024. Australia recognises — for the first time in a binding treaty — that Tuvalu's statehood continues despite climate-driven sea-level rise; commits to assist Tuvalu in a major natural disaster, health pandemic or military aggression; and creates a special mobility visa allowing a capped number of Tuvaluans (around 280 a year) to live, work and study in Australia. In return, under Article 4, Tuvalu must mutually agree with Australia any security or defence engagement with any other state — covering defence, policing, border protection, cyber, ports, telecommunications and energy. Money: No fixed sum in the treaty; accompanied by expanded Australian support — coastal-adaptation works, an undersea telecommunications cable and increased development assistance. Commits Australia to: a standing security-assistance guarantee, climate and budget support, and a migration pathway — in exchange for a say over Tuvalu's external security arrangements. Treaty & text (DFAT).

Nauru — Nauru–Australia Treaty, 2024

Signed 9 December 2024. Australia provides around A$100 million in direct budget support and A$40 million for policing and security over five years, and backed the Commonwealth Bank stepping in to keep Nauru banked after Bendigo Bank's exit. In exchange, Nauru and Australia must jointly agree any engagement by other countries in Nauru's security, banking and telecommunications sectors — an effective Australian veto, widely read as locking out a Chinese policing or infrastructure foothold after Nauru switched recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in January 2024. Money: A$100 million in budget support plus A$40 million for policing and security over five years (A$140 million total), plus arranging Commonwealth Bank banking. Commits Australia to: multi-year budget, banking and policing support — in exchange for a veto over Nauru's third-party security and financial deals. Nauru (DFAT).

Tonga — Statement of Intent, ‘Kaume’a Ofi’ partnership (2025)

On 19 September 2025, during the state visit of King Tupou VI and Queen Nanasipau’u, Australia and Tonga signed a Statement of Intent to elevate their relationship into a ‘Kaume’a Ofi’ (‘close friends’) partnership — a framework of intent, not a binding treaty. It sits on decades of security cooperation: the Defence Cooperation Program (ADF advisers alongside His Majesty’s Armed Forces, disaster relief, and a Northern Command commissioned in Vava’u), the Pacific Maritime Security Program (two Guardian-class patrol boats), and the Tonga–Australia Policing Partnership. Much of the recent competition runs through sport: Tonga has signed on to Australia’s A$150 million Pacific rugby-union funding package (shared with Fiji and Samoa, overseen by DFAT), on top of a share of the A$250 million for Pacific rugby-league development inside the A$600 million PNG package. The context is openly strategic — China funded Tonga’s ~A$40 million national sports complex and courted its rugby union, and Australia’s money is the counter. Money: Australia is Tonga’s largest bilateral development and security partner — funding the Defence Cooperation Program, the two patrol boats and the policing partnership — and has now added ~A$150 million in Pacific rugby-union funding (Fiji/Tonga/Samoa) plus a share of A$250 million in rugby-league development, explicitly to counter Chinese influence. Commits Australia to: a close-friends partnership; ongoing security, maritime and policing cooperation; and major sports funding — no mutual-defence obligation. Tonga country brief (DFAT).

Solomon Islands — Bilateral Security Treaty (2017), deepening toward a comprehensive treaty (2026)

Australia’s 2017 Bilateral Security Treaty with Solomon Islands — its first in the Pacific — lets Australian police, defence and civilian personnel deploy rapidly at both governments’ request; it was activated in November 2021, when more than 1,600 Australian and Pacific personnel deployed to Honiara during civil unrest. On 3 June 2026, Prime Ministers Albanese and Wale signed a joint statement and agreement of understanding elevating the relationship and committing to negotiate a full comprehensive treaty, alongside a A$200 million support package for cyclone recovery and the fuel/energy crisis. The backdrop is unmistakable: Solomon Islands signed a still-secret security pact with China in 2022 — the event that reshaped Australia’s whole Pacific posture — and the new government has said it will review it. Money: Australia is Solomon Islands’ primary security and largest economic partner (Defence Cooperation Program, Pacific Maritime Security Program, police partnership and a Honiara training centre), plus the A$200M 2026 package. Commits Australia to: rapid deployment on request, standing security and policing cooperation, and negotiation of a wider treaty — no automatic mutual-defence obligation. Bilateral Security Treaty (DFAT).

In July 2026 the pattern accelerated. Australia and Fiji signed the Ocean of Peace treaty — a mutual-defence alliance that makes Fiji Australia’s fourth formal ally (after the US, New Zealand and PNG) and is open to other Pacific states joining — and Australia signed an agreement with Vanuatu barring any foreign military base on its soil. Solomon Islands is deepening its own ties with Australia (see Section 3), even as its still-secret 2022 pact with China remains in place; New Zealand is now weighing whether to join the Fiji alliance.

4. Access & cooperation agreements — how forces operate together

These set the legal terms for training, visits, basing and logistics. They deepen integration and interoperability but do not, by themselves, commit Australia to war.

United States — Force Posture Agreement, 2014

Signed 12 August 2014 (25-year term), this underpins the rotational US military presence in Australia: the Marine Rotational Force–Darwin (around 2,500 personnel each dry season), Enhanced Air Cooperation, and expanding US bomber, fuel and submarine infrastructure in the north and west. Money: No payment to the United States; Australia funds the northern-base, fuel and submarine infrastructure that hosts the rotations (several billion dollars across bases this decade). Commits Australia to: hosting a substantial, growing rotational US force presence and associated infrastructure. Treaty record (DFAT database).

Japan — Reciprocal Access Agreement, 2022

Signed 6 January 2022, in force 13 August 2023 — Japan's first visiting-forces agreement with any country other than the United States. It is a status-of-forces framework: it streamlines the legal, customs and jurisdictional arrangements for Australian and Japanese forces to train and operate in each other's territory (Japanese F-35s to RAAF Tindal; Australian jets to Japan). It is not a mutual-defence pact — no promise to come to the other's defence. Money: No direct financial commitment; costs sit within each country's own defence budget. Commits Australia to: a standing framework for joint exercises and mutual troop access with Japan. RAA (Defence).

United Kingdom — Defence & Security Cooperation Agreement, 2024

Signed in Canberra on 21 March 2024 (laid before the UK Parliament as “Australia No. 1 (2025)”). A broad status-of-forces and cooperation agreement covering the legal terms for UK and Australian forces operating together — complementing AUKUS and the 2025 Geelong submarine treaty. Money: No direct financial commitment (separate from the AUKUS and Geelong submarine spending above). Commits Australia to: a modern legal framework for expanded UK–Australia force cooperation and presence. Agreement (GOV.UK).

Indonesia — Defence Cooperation Agreement (2024) and 2025 security treaty

Australia and Indonesia signed a treaty-level Defence Cooperation Agreement on 20 August 2024 — the most substantial defence pact between the two neighbours — enabling expanded joint training, exercises and operational cooperation, building on the 2006 Lombok Treaty. In November 2025 the two leaders agreed a further, upgraded security treaty (signed early 2026) committing both countries to consult at leader and ministerial level and, if either's security is threatened, to consider measures “individually or jointly.” It stops short of a mutual-defence guarantee. Money: No fixed treaty sum; supported by defence-cooperation funding, joint training and equipment programs. Commits Australia to: deep defence cooperation and a standing security-consultation commitment with Indonesia. Indonesia (DFAT).

Longstanding partners — Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand

Australia holds mature status-of-forces and training agreements with Singapore (a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and a 25-year military-training agreement using Shoalwater Bay and other ranges), Malaysia (a status-of-forces agreement; RAAF Butterworth), and New Zealand — Australia's closest defence partner, under the Closer Defence Relations framework and a shared status-of-forces agreement. In March 2026 the two governments signed ‘ANZAC 2035: Operationalising the Australia–New Zealand Alliance’, a ten-year plan to turn the alliance into practical integration — interoperability, force posture, joint capability and combined engagement in the Pacific — and in July 2026 the two armies signed a renewed Plan ANZAC to train, deploy and operate as one force. Money: No direct payments; longstanding, largely cost-shared training and basing arrangements. Commits Australia to: hosting and exchanging forces, joint training and standing cooperation. Treaty records (AustLII / DFAT).

Germany — Space Security Agreement (2026) and defence-industrial cooperation

Australia–Germany defence ties deepened sharply in 2026. At the Defence Ministers' Meeting in Canberra on 26 March 2026, the two signed a space security agreement — a joint sensor network and mutual data-sharing to give early warning of hostile activity against satellites — and agreed to open negotiations toward a Status of Forces Agreement. At the 8 June 2026 “2+2” talks in Berlin they formally began those SOFA negotiations, aiming for an in-principle text by the end of 2026. Industrial cooperation is now substantial: a Letter of Intent with German warhead-maker TDW to build Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile warheads in Australia, alongside the Rheinmetall Boxer programme in Brisbane — including 100-plus vehicles exported to the German Army, Australia's largest-ever defence export. Money: No payment under the space pact; the linked industrial deals run toward Australia — the Rheinmetall Boxer export is worth more than A$1 billion to Australian industry. Commits Australia to: a signed space-security partnership and deep defence-industrial integration with Germany; a status-of-forces framework is in active negotiation. Defence Ministers' joint statement · 2+2 consultations.

Israel — Defence-industry & cyber cooperation (MOUs, 2017–2019)

Australia's defence relationship with Israel is one of cooperation and procurement rather than a treaty or alliance. It rests on a Memorandum of Understanding on defence-industry cooperation (signed October 2017) and an MOU on cyber-security cooperation (January 2019), underpinned by annual defence strategic talks since 2018 and a resident Australian Defence Attaché in Tel Aviv from 2019. There is no mutual-defence commitment and no status-of-forces or basing arrangement; the substance is procurement, with Australia a significant buyer of Israeli systems from Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael. It has become one of Australia's more politically contested defence relationships during the war in Gaza. Money: Australian government contracts with Israeli defence firms total well over A$2 billion since 2004 (analysis of public tender data) — led by about A$1.9 billion to Elbit Systems, with further contracts to Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael, plus a roughly A$900 million Elbit subcontract on the Army's Redback vehicles. Commits Australia to: MOU-level defence-industry and cyber cooperation and strategic dialogue — no binding defence obligation. Israel country brief (DFAT).

5. Multilateral frameworks

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 1971

A five-nation arrangement between Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. In the event of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore, the members consult on a joint response — a consultative commitment, not an automatic obligation to fight. It sustains the Integrated Area Defence System and regular exercises. Australia's oldest standing multilateral defence commitment in the region. Money: No direct financial commitment; shared exercise and integrated air-defence costs. Commits Australia to: consultation and standing air-defence cooperation in South-East Asia. Treaty record (DFAT database).

Five Eyes intelligence alliance

The intelligence-sharing partnership between Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, rooted in the post-war UKUSA signals-intelligence agreement. Not a defence treaty, but arguably the deepest integration of all: shared signals intelligence, joint facilities (including Pine Gap), and closely aligned assessment. Money: No published figure; intelligence-sharing costs sit within the national agencies' budgets. Commits Australia to: deep intelligence integration and reciprocity with the four partners. Security & intelligence (DFAT).

The Quad

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — Australia, the United States, Japan and India. A strategic dialogue and coordination forum (maritime security, infrastructure, technology, disaster response), not a treaty and not a defence pact. It binds Australia to no defence obligation but signals alignment. Money: No defence funding; project-based cooperation only. Commits Australia to: nothing legally binding — a coordination and posture forum. Quad (DFAT).

NATO partnership (IP4)

Australia is one of NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners (with Japan, South Korea and New Zealand) and agreed an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme with NATO in 2023. It is a partnership, not membership: no collective-defence obligation, but growing coordination on cyber, technology and interoperability. Money: No financial obligation; partnership activities run from existing budgets. Commits Australia to: structured cooperation with NATO — no Article 5 obligation. NATO partnership (DFAT).

6. Deepening & in negotiation

Several relationships are moving toward firmer footing and are worth tracking:

Philippines — a Strategic Partnership (2023), joint South China Sea maritime patrols, and a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement under negotiation. India — a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and a 2020 Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement. Republic of Korea — a “2+2” foreign-and-defence framework and defence-industry cooperation. France — defence ties rebuilt after the 2021 AUKUS rupture, with renewed Indo-Pacific cooperation. Other European partners are likewise expanding exercises and information-sharing with Australia. These are cooperation-tier relationships; none currently carries a mutual-defence obligation.

7. What the register adds up to

Three things stand out when the agreements are laid side by side. First, the genuinely binding defence commitments remain few: the US alliance (ANZUS), and now a mutual-defence alliance with Papua New Guinea. Most of the rest — however consequential — are access, cooperation and intelligence arrangements rather than promises to fight. Second, the direction of travel is unmistakably toward more integration and more commitment: AUKUS ties Australia's core capability to US and UK systems for decades, and the Pacific treaties extend Australian security responsibility outward, island by island. Third, almost every recent agreement is shaped by strategic competition with China — whether as the driver (the Pacific veto treaties) or the intended counterweight (AUKUS, the Quad, the RAAs).

Modern Movement Australia's position, argued in Memo 18 and Memo 31, is that Australians should be able to see this picture clearly and judge it for themselves — and that the smartest security posture for a continental trading nation is national sufficiency, armed neutrality and regional integration, not deeper entanglement in a contest it cannot win. This register is offered simply so the commitments already made in our name are on one page, in plain language, with the sources attached. Read the deals; draw your own conclusions.

References & sources

1. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Treaties Database and Treaties pages. dfat.gov.au. The authoritative register of treaties to which Australia is party, including status and text where published. Treaty-making process (Executive action under s.61 of the Constitution, tabling and JSCOT scrutiny) per DFAT's Treaties Section.
2. Australasian Legal Information Institute, Australian Treaties Library — Defence & Security. austlii.edu.au. Full list of Australia's defence and security treaties by Australian Treaty Series (ATS) number, including ANZUS ([1952] ATS 2) and status-of-forces agreements with New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.
3. AUKUS: DFAT AUKUS pages; AUKUS Wikipedia entry (for the Optimal Pathway of 13 March 2023, the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement in force 8 February 2022, the trilateral submarine treaty of 2024, and the UK–Australia Geelong Treaty signed 26 July 2025). Headline programme cost ~A$368 billion to the mid-2050s per Australian Government budget statements. AUKUS Defence Ministers' Meeting, Singapore, 30 May 2026.
4. PNG–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty (“Pukpuk Treaty”): signed 6 October 2025; treaty text at dfat.gov.au (PDF); Parliament of Australia JSCOT referral 25 November 2025; Al Jazeera and Parliamentary Library FlagPost (“Australia's first alliance in 74 years”), October–December 2025.
5. Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty: signed 9 November 2023, in force 28 August 2024. DFAT treaty page, text and explanatory memorandum. dfat.gov.au. Article 4 mutual-agreement (security-engagement) provision.
6. Nauru–Australia Treaty: signed 9 December 2024. Reuters / Indo-Pacific Defense Forum; CNN (10 December 2024); Lowy Institute The Interpreter; The Diplomat. A$100m budget support and A$40m policing/security over five years; Commonwealth Bank banking arrangement; mutual-agreement (veto) over third-country engagement in security, banking and telecommunications.
7. Japan–Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement: signed 6 January 2022, entered into force 13 August 2023. Australian Department of Defence and Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. defence.gov.au. First Japanese visiting-forces agreement outside the US alliance.
8. UK–Australia Agreement for Defence and Security Cooperation: signed Canberra 21 March 2024; UK “Australia No. 1 (2025)”. gov.uk. UK–Australia Geelong Treaty (50-year SSN-AUKUS build), 26 July 2025.
9. Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement, signed 20 August 2024; upgraded security treaty agreed November 2025 (Prabowo state visit) and signed early 2026, per Al Jazeera and ABC News; building on the 2006 Lombok Treaty. DFAT Indonesia country page.
10. Australia–US Force Posture Agreement (2014, 25-year term); Five Power Defence Arrangements (1971); Five Eyes / UKUSA intelligence partnership; Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (2023). DFAT security, regional-architecture and NATO pages; Australian Treaties Database.